Creative Abductive Inference and Its Role for Inductive Metaphysics in Comparison to Other Metaphysical Methods
PI: Prof. Dr. Gerhard Schurz (Düsseldorf)
PI: Prof. Dr. Markus Schrenk (Düsseldorf)
Dr. Siegfried Jaag (Düsseldorf)
Christian Feldbacher-Escamilla (Düsseldorf)
Project A2 “Creative Abductive Inference and Its Role for Inductive Metaphysics in Comparison to Other Metaphysical Methods” explores creative abductive inference (CAI) and inference to the best explanation (IBE) as methods of Inductive Metaphysics. In the first part of the project, the general method is developed and its rationality in metaphysics is critically explored. Four criteria are investigated that have been suggested in the literature for the purpose of discriminating content-rich abductions from empty post-fact speculations: (i) analogy, (ii) unification, (iii) common cause abduction and (iv) independent testability. On the basis of selected metaphysical concepts (including the concept of external reality, natural necessity, causality and causal power) it is examined to what extent selected metaphysical abductions from the metaphysical literature satisfy these criteria.
The aim of the second part of the project of the inquiry is threefold: (1) It examines and rebuts several potential criticisms of Inductive Metaphysics, specifically targeted at CAI and IBE and generally at Inductive Metaphysics. (2) It critically explores whether and to what extent CAI and IBE are already used in contemporary metaphysics. (3) It investigates the question how CAIs and IBEs compare to other methods used in contemporary metaphysics, and whether some of these other methods fit into the programme of Inductive Metaphysics.
PI: Prof. Dr. Markus Schrenk (Düsseldorf)
Dr. Siegfried Jaag (Düsseldorf)
Christian Feldbacher-Escamilla (Düsseldorf)
Project A2 “Creative Abductive Inference and Its Role for Inductive Metaphysics in Comparison to Other Metaphysical Methods” explores creative abductive inference (CAI) and inference to the best explanation (IBE) as methods of Inductive Metaphysics. In the first part of the project, the general method is developed and its rationality in metaphysics is critically explored. Four criteria are investigated that have been suggested in the literature for the purpose of discriminating content-rich abductions from empty post-fact speculations: (i) analogy, (ii) unification, (iii) common cause abduction and (iv) independent testability. On the basis of selected metaphysical concepts (including the concept of external reality, natural necessity, causality and causal power) it is examined to what extent selected metaphysical abductions from the metaphysical literature satisfy these criteria.
The aim of the second part of the project of the inquiry is threefold: (1) It examines and rebuts several potential criticisms of Inductive Metaphysics, specifically targeted at CAI and IBE and generally at Inductive Metaphysics. (2) It critically explores whether and to what extent CAI and IBE are already used in contemporary metaphysics. (3) It investigates the question how CAIs and IBEs compare to other methods used in contemporary metaphysics, and whether some of these other methods fit into the programme of Inductive Metaphysics.
