Inductive Methods in Kant and Neo-Kantianism
PI: Prof. Dr. Kristina Engelhard (Trier)
PD Dr. David Hommen (Trier)
Associated: Em. Prof. Dr. Dr. Brigitte Falkenburg (Dortmund)
In its second phase, project A4 "Inductive Methods in Kant and Neo-Kantianism" investigates the historical background of the later programmes of Inductive Metaphysics (IM) from a systematic point of view, focusing on Kant’s critical philosophy and its reception in Neo-Kantianism. Neo-Kantianism is the most important bridge between Kant and contemporary IM. Contrary to most influential 19th and 20th century views about Kant’s critical philosophy of nature,we claim that it was not only based on a priori methods, but also on empirical assumptions. In addition, we claim that the philosophy of the Marburg and the Southwest schools of Neo-Kantianism inherit this feature, resulting in a tension between a priori conceptions and the historical dimension of science.
Part Iof the project is concerned with Inductive Metaphysics in Kant’s critical theory of nature. We will examine the role of analogical reasoning as an inductive method in Kant’s critical philosophy and develop an interpretation of Kant’s Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (MFNS) (1786) as a work that is to a considerable degree an exercise in Inductive Metaphysics, in contrast to the common portrayal of Kant’s work.
Part II concentrates on two specific doctrines in Kant that are systematically relevant for Inductive Metaphysics. First, we interpret the transcendental ideas as models, focusing on their regulative use as outlined in the Transcendental Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason (CpR) and applied in the MFNS. Hence,wewill show that Kant’s metaphysics of nature can in part be understood as a modelling view of metaphysics. Second, we argue that his theory of the principles of the regulative use of the transcendental ideas should be taken as an account of theory choice criteria, which are relevant in IBEs.
Part III investigates the elements of Inductive Metaphysics in the Neo-Kantian tradition, focusing on the systematization of the natural and cultural sciences in the Southwest school and the systematic philosophy of the Marburg school. Within the research unit, the project has the overall objective of clarifying the following questions: How does Kant’s critique and modification of the concept and aims of metaphysics in his doctrine as well as his practice of metaphysics relate to the logical empiricists? In which way does Kant’s explicitly modified programme and his practice of metaphysics contribute to an adequate present-day understanding of IM? Does IM result in a modified picture of the aims and scope of metaphysics from a Kantian perspective? How significant is the Neo-Kantianimpact on IM?
PD Dr. David Hommen (Trier)
Associated: Em. Prof. Dr. Dr. Brigitte Falkenburg (Dortmund)
In its second phase, project A4 "Inductive Methods in Kant and Neo-Kantianism" investigates the historical background of the later programmes of Inductive Metaphysics (IM) from a systematic point of view, focusing on Kant’s critical philosophy and its reception in Neo-Kantianism. Neo-Kantianism is the most important bridge between Kant and contemporary IM. Contrary to most influential 19th and 20th century views about Kant’s critical philosophy of nature,we claim that it was not only based on a priori methods, but also on empirical assumptions. In addition, we claim that the philosophy of the Marburg and the Southwest schools of Neo-Kantianism inherit this feature, resulting in a tension between a priori conceptions and the historical dimension of science.
Part Iof the project is concerned with Inductive Metaphysics in Kant’s critical theory of nature. We will examine the role of analogical reasoning as an inductive method in Kant’s critical philosophy and develop an interpretation of Kant’s Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (MFNS) (1786) as a work that is to a considerable degree an exercise in Inductive Metaphysics, in contrast to the common portrayal of Kant’s work.
Part II concentrates on two specific doctrines in Kant that are systematically relevant for Inductive Metaphysics. First, we interpret the transcendental ideas as models, focusing on their regulative use as outlined in the Transcendental Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason (CpR) and applied in the MFNS. Hence,wewill show that Kant’s metaphysics of nature can in part be understood as a modelling view of metaphysics. Second, we argue that his theory of the principles of the regulative use of the transcendental ideas should be taken as an account of theory choice criteria, which are relevant in IBEs.
Part III investigates the elements of Inductive Metaphysics in the Neo-Kantian tradition, focusing on the systematization of the natural and cultural sciences in the Southwest school and the systematic philosophy of the Marburg school. Within the research unit, the project has the overall objective of clarifying the following questions: How does Kant’s critique and modification of the concept and aims of metaphysics in his doctrine as well as his practice of metaphysics relate to the logical empiricists? In which way does Kant’s explicitly modified programme and his practice of metaphysics contribute to an adequate present-day understanding of IM? Does IM result in a modified picture of the aims and scope of metaphysics from a Kantian perspective? How significant is the Neo-Kantianimpact on IM?
