Free Will and Causality
Haus der Universitaet, Schadowplatz 14, 40212 Duesseldorf, Germany
Sept. 26 - 27, 2019
Haus der Universitaet, Schadowplatz 14, 40212 Duesseldorf, Germany
Sept. 26 - 27, 2019
Description
The conference aims at bringing together experts on free will and causality in order to explore what the debates about these topics can learn from each other. In particular, the connection between metaphysical aspects of the free will problem and how they depend on or relate to causation in general as well as to more specific theories of causation shall be investigated. It is, for example, widely believed that free will requires control and that control is a causal notion. Whether one is a compatibilist or a libertarian, one must have a theory of control that the agent exerts over her actions. Another important requirement for free will, according to sourcehood libertarians, is ultimate origination of one’s actions: to have free will is to be able to initiate causal chains, i.e., to have a certain causal ability, sometimes referred to as a ‘causal power’. These causal notions might greatly profit from being treated in accordance with different accounts of causation. Different understandings of free will might, the other way round, support different theories of causation or might help in solving tasks such as identifying causal structure.
Our conference will address questions like the following ones:
Questions to be addressed at the conference might also include traditional problems regarding the compatibility of free will with physical determinism and indeterminism or the conceptual relations between free will, rational deliberation, and moral responsibility as well as their bearing for different understandings of causation.
The conference aims at bringing together experts on free will and causality in order to explore what the debates about these topics can learn from each other. In particular, the connection between metaphysical aspects of the free will problem and how they depend on or relate to causation in general as well as to more specific theories of causation shall be investigated. It is, for example, widely believed that free will requires control and that control is a causal notion. Whether one is a compatibilist or a libertarian, one must have a theory of control that the agent exerts over her actions. Another important requirement for free will, according to sourcehood libertarians, is ultimate origination of one’s actions: to have free will is to be able to initiate causal chains, i.e., to have a certain causal ability, sometimes referred to as a ‘causal power’. These causal notions might greatly profit from being treated in accordance with different accounts of causation. Different understandings of free will might, the other way round, support different theories of causation or might help in solving tasks such as identifying causal structure.
Our conference will address questions like the following ones:
- What concepts of causation are required by libertarian and compatibilist theories of free will?
- Which constraints and consequences follow from the endorsement of specific theories of causation for one’s understanding of control that the agent exerts over her actions?
- What is the relation between concepts such as free will, agency, sourcehood, control, intervention, causation, and (in)determinism?
Questions to be addressed at the conference might also include traditional problems regarding the compatibility of free will with physical determinism and indeterminism or the conceptual relations between free will, rational deliberation, and moral responsibility as well as their bearing for different understandings of causation.
Invited Speakers
The conference is organized by Maria Sekatskaya (DCLPS, University of Duesseldorf), Alexander Gebharter (University of Groningen), and Gerhard Schurz (DCLPS, University of Duesseldorf). The event is funded by the DFG (German Research Foundation) research group FOR 2495: Inductive Metaphysics.
- Sander Beckers, Utrecht University
- Hans Briegel, University of Innsbruck
- Laura Ekstrom, College of William & Mary in Virginia
- Nadine Elzein, University of Oxford
- John Lemos, Coe College
- Christian Loew, University of Cologne
- Timothy O'Connor, Indiana University
The conference is organized by Maria Sekatskaya (DCLPS, University of Duesseldorf), Alexander Gebharter (University of Groningen), and Gerhard Schurz (DCLPS, University of Duesseldorf). The event is funded by the DFG (German Research Foundation) research group FOR 2495: Inductive Metaphysics.
Call for Papers
We invite submissions of abstracts for 30 minutes presentations followed by 15 min discussions. Proposals may be submitted on any of the aforementioned questions, but also on related topics. Please submit your abstract (max. 700 words), prepared for blind-review, via email (subject: “SUBMISSION – FREE WILL AND CAUSALITY - YOUR SURNAME) to maria.sekatskaya@gmail.com. The name of the author as well as affiliation information should be included in the email. The submission deadline is April 30, 2019.
There is no conference fee and attendance is open to all. Since space is limited, however, attendees not giving a presentation are required to register before the conference via sending an email to maria.sekatskaya@gmail.com.
We invite submissions of abstracts for 30 minutes presentations followed by 15 min discussions. Proposals may be submitted on any of the aforementioned questions, but also on related topics. Please submit your abstract (max. 700 words), prepared for blind-review, via email (subject: “SUBMISSION – FREE WILL AND CAUSALITY - YOUR SURNAME) to maria.sekatskaya@gmail.com. The name of the author as well as affiliation information should be included in the email. The submission deadline is April 30, 2019.
There is no conference fee and attendance is open to all. Since space is limited, however, attendees not giving a presentation are required to register before the conference via sending an email to maria.sekatskaya@gmail.com.
