Metaphysics as Modelling. Contemporary and Kantian Issues
University of Trier, Germany
Oct 7.-8. 2021
University of Trier, Germany
Oct 7.-8. 2021
Speakers
Katherine Brading
Brigitte Falkenburg
Axel Gelfert
David Hommen/Kristina Engelhard
Siegfried Jaag/Markus Schrenk
Michela Massimi
James O'Shea
L. A. Paul
Lorenzo Spagnesi
The use of models such as the Lotka-Volterra model for predator/prey-population-dynamics or the billiard ball model of gases have proven to be tremendously useful in the natural sciences.
Recently, philosophers have suggested that applying models in metaphysics is also a legitimate, beneficial and necessary enterprise (Godfrey-Smith; Nolan; Paul; cf. Brading for a critique). As examples for models in metaphysics have been given: Humean supervenience and Armstrong’s anti-Humeanism (Godfrey-Smith) or the neuron diagrams in theories of causation (Paul), etc.
If modelling plays a role in metaphysics, then the question also arises whether examples of it can be found in the history of philosophy or even approaches that reflect on it, albeit in different terms. In fact, in Kant's work, there are parts of his theory that can be interpreted as a modelling approach in metaphysics.
To which extent is a modelling attitude indeed applicable in metaphysics? Can the role model-building might play in metaphysics be conceived as an abductive enterprise? Can a modelling account in metaphysics also be found in Kant and what are its features? These and other question shall find answers in our workshop.
Organizers: Kristina Engelhard (Trier), David Hommen (Trier), Siegfried Jaag (Düsseldorf), Markus Schrenk (Düsseldorf)
Katherine Brading
Brigitte Falkenburg
Axel Gelfert
David Hommen/Kristina Engelhard
Siegfried Jaag/Markus Schrenk
Michela Massimi
James O'Shea
L. A. Paul
Lorenzo Spagnesi
The use of models such as the Lotka-Volterra model for predator/prey-population-dynamics or the billiard ball model of gases have proven to be tremendously useful in the natural sciences.
Recently, philosophers have suggested that applying models in metaphysics is also a legitimate, beneficial and necessary enterprise (Godfrey-Smith; Nolan; Paul; cf. Brading for a critique). As examples for models in metaphysics have been given: Humean supervenience and Armstrong’s anti-Humeanism (Godfrey-Smith) or the neuron diagrams in theories of causation (Paul), etc.
If modelling plays a role in metaphysics, then the question also arises whether examples of it can be found in the history of philosophy or even approaches that reflect on it, albeit in different terms. In fact, in Kant's work, there are parts of his theory that can be interpreted as a modelling approach in metaphysics.
To which extent is a modelling attitude indeed applicable in metaphysics? Can the role model-building might play in metaphysics be conceived as an abductive enterprise? Can a modelling account in metaphysics also be found in Kant and what are its features? These and other question shall find answers in our workshop.
Organizers: Kristina Engelhard (Trier), David Hommen (Trier), Siegfried Jaag (Düsseldorf), Markus Schrenk (Düsseldorf)
