International Workshop
Properties and Laws in the Light of inductive Metaphysics
Haus der Universität, Schadowplatz 14, 40212 Düsseldorf, Germany
Mar 22 - Mar 23, 2018
This workshop is organized by the DFG-funded research groups "Inductive Metaphysics" (FOR 2495) and "Causation, Laws, Dispositions and Explanations at the Interface of Science and Metaphysics" (FOR 1063).
Properties and Laws in the Light of inductive Metaphysics
Haus der Universität, Schadowplatz 14, 40212 Düsseldorf, Germany
Mar 22 - Mar 23, 2018
This workshop is organized by the DFG-funded research groups "Inductive Metaphysics" (FOR 2495) and "Causation, Laws, Dispositions and Explanations at the Interface of Science and Metaphysics" (FOR 1063).
Description
In this workshop, we will explore recent developments in the debate on laws of nature and (natural) properties. The guiding idea is that which laws of nature and which properties there are is discovered by our best sciences: they tell us precisely which laws hold and which properties figure therein. However, per se this leaves unanswered the metaphysical questions what a law of nature and what a (natural) property is.
Accordingly, our workshop has two aims. First, it is supposed to address the (first-order) metaphysical question what the right conception of laws and properties is. Does the (Better) Best System Analysis provide a metaphysically adequate account of laws? Which role do natural properties play for theories of lawhood? How can we determine what the natural properties are?
Second, it asks the (meta-metaphysical) question what methodology (abductive reasoning, IBEs, indispensability arguments, etc.) is apt to bring the metaphysics of laws and properties in line with scientific practice.
In this workshop, we will explore recent developments in the debate on laws of nature and (natural) properties. The guiding idea is that which laws of nature and which properties there are is discovered by our best sciences: they tell us precisely which laws hold and which properties figure therein. However, per se this leaves unanswered the metaphysical questions what a law of nature and what a (natural) property is.
Accordingly, our workshop has two aims. First, it is supposed to address the (first-order) metaphysical question what the right conception of laws and properties is. Does the (Better) Best System Analysis provide a metaphysically adequate account of laws? Which role do natural properties play for theories of lawhood? How can we determine what the natural properties are?
Second, it asks the (meta-metaphysical) question what methodology (abductive reasoning, IBEs, indispensability arguments, etc.) is apt to bring the metaphysics of laws and properties in line with scientific practice.
Speakers
- Andreas Bartels (Bonn, Germany)
- Heather Demarest (Boulder, Colorado)
- Siegfried Jaag (Düsseldorf, Germany) & Christian Loew (Cologne, Germany)
- Michael Hicks (Cologne, Germany)
- Tyler Hildebrandt (Halifax, Cananda)
- Vera Hoffmann-Kolss (Cologne, Germany)
- Vincent Lam (Geneva, Switzerland)
- Markus Schrenk (Düsseldorf, Germany)
- Tuomas Tahko (Bristol, England)
- Tobias Wilsch (Tübingen, Germany)
Program
Thursday, Mar 22
14.00 - 15.00
15.20 - 16.20 16.40 - 17.40 18.00 - 19.00 |
Michael Hicks: "Symmetries and the Inductive Discovery of Humean Laws"
Tyler Hildebrandt: "Best Systems: Metaphysical or Epistemological?" Heather Demarest: "In Defense of a Modal Best System" Siegfried Jaag & Christian Loew: "Humean Reductionism and Iterated Counterfactuals" |
Friday, Mar 23
09.00 - 10.00
10.30 - 11.30 12.00 - 13.00 14.30 - 15.30 16.00 - 17.00 17.30 - 18.30 |
Vincent Lam: "Metaphysics of laws in Dynamical Spacetime and beyond"
Tuomas Tahko: "Special Science Laws and Higher-Level Kinds" Vera Hoffmann-Kolss: "Causal Indeterminacy, Vagueness and Humean Supervenience" lunch Markus Schrenk: "Production and Necessity" Tobias Wilsch: "Governance and Production" Andreas Bartels: "Explaining the Modal Force of Natural Laws" |
Abstracts
Andreas Bartels : “Explaining the Modal Force of Natural Laws”
In this paper, I will defend the thesis that fundamental natural laws are distinguished from accidental empirical generalizations neither by metaphysical necessity (e.g. Ellis 1999, 2001, Bird 2005, 2007) nor by contingent necessitation (Armstrong 1983). The only sort of modal force that distinguishes natural laws, I will argue, arises from the peculiar physical property of mutual independence of elementary processes exemplifying the laws. Mutual independence of elementary processes means that their existence and their nature do not depend in any way on which other processes presently occur. It is exactly this general physical property of elementary processes in the actual world that provides natural laws with their specific modal force and grounds the experience of nature’s ‘recalcitrance’. Thus, the modal force of natural laws is explained by contingent non-modal properties of nature. In the second part of the paper, I deal with some alleged counterexamples to my approach: constraint laws, compositional laws, symmetry principles and conservation laws. These sorts of laws turn out to be compatible with my approach: constraint laws and compositional laws do not represent the dynamics of process-types by themselves, but only as constitutive parts of a complete set of equations, whereas symmetry principles and conservation laws do not represent any specific dynamics, but only impose general constraints on possible processes.
In this paper, I will defend the thesis that fundamental natural laws are distinguished from accidental empirical generalizations neither by metaphysical necessity (e.g. Ellis 1999, 2001, Bird 2005, 2007) nor by contingent necessitation (Armstrong 1983). The only sort of modal force that distinguishes natural laws, I will argue, arises from the peculiar physical property of mutual independence of elementary processes exemplifying the laws. Mutual independence of elementary processes means that their existence and their nature do not depend in any way on which other processes presently occur. It is exactly this general physical property of elementary processes in the actual world that provides natural laws with their specific modal force and grounds the experience of nature’s ‘recalcitrance’. Thus, the modal force of natural laws is explained by contingent non-modal properties of nature. In the second part of the paper, I deal with some alleged counterexamples to my approach: constraint laws, compositional laws, symmetry principles and conservation laws. These sorts of laws turn out to be compatible with my approach: constraint laws and compositional laws do not represent the dynamics of process-types by themselves, but only as constitutive parts of a complete set of equations, whereas symmetry principles and conservation laws do not represent any specific dynamics, but only impose general constraints on possible processes.
Heather Demarest: “In Defense of a Modal Best System”
Recently, philosophers have started thinking seriously about combining a modal ontology with systematizing laws of nature. An ontology is modal just in case there are restrictions on how it can possibly be arranged, and laws of nature count as systematizing just in case they describe, but do not determine, what happens in a world. While it is still a matter of some debate how best to formulate the modal component of the view, I will show that it is the modal component that allows us to make sense of actual scientific practice. Crucially, scientists expend a significant amount of resources (both in time and money) in order to produce, study, and explain new phenomena. They also develop models that work out implications for a variety of non-actual initial conditions. These practices point to a thoroughly modal target of inquiry. I go on to argue that this concern for the modal is rational even by purely pragmatic standards because it is helpful for achieving actual goals.
Recently, philosophers have started thinking seriously about combining a modal ontology with systematizing laws of nature. An ontology is modal just in case there are restrictions on how it can possibly be arranged, and laws of nature count as systematizing just in case they describe, but do not determine, what happens in a world. While it is still a matter of some debate how best to formulate the modal component of the view, I will show that it is the modal component that allows us to make sense of actual scientific practice. Crucially, scientists expend a significant amount of resources (both in time and money) in order to produce, study, and explain new phenomena. They also develop models that work out implications for a variety of non-actual initial conditions. These practices point to a thoroughly modal target of inquiry. I go on to argue that this concern for the modal is rational even by purely pragmatic standards because it is helpful for achieving actual goals.
Michael Hicks: “Symmetries and the Inductive Discovery of Humean Laws"
Recently, a number of authors (Jaag and Loew, Dorst) have argued that pragmatic considerations motivate the idea that the laws of physics should be invariant under certain symmetry transformations. These arguments follow Wigner (1967) in noting that laws which are not invariant under, for example, the Poincare symmetry group will deliver behavior that varies in different experimental contexts. Since our only access to laws is through their application to a wide variety of isolated systems, we would be unable to inductively discover such laws. Here, I'll argue that that this argument goes too far: laws could fail to be invariant under any of these symmetries and still be discoverable and applicable--provided their divergence from perfectly respecting these symmetries is not too great. So, rather than requiring laws to be strictly invariant under these symmetry transformations, we should require something weaker, for example, invariance in a low-energy limit. I then discuss how this bears on debates about the metaphysics of laws.
Recently, a number of authors (Jaag and Loew, Dorst) have argued that pragmatic considerations motivate the idea that the laws of physics should be invariant under certain symmetry transformations. These arguments follow Wigner (1967) in noting that laws which are not invariant under, for example, the Poincare symmetry group will deliver behavior that varies in different experimental contexts. Since our only access to laws is through their application to a wide variety of isolated systems, we would be unable to inductively discover such laws. Here, I'll argue that that this argument goes too far: laws could fail to be invariant under any of these symmetries and still be discoverable and applicable--provided their divergence from perfectly respecting these symmetries is not too great. So, rather than requiring laws to be strictly invariant under these symmetry transformations, we should require something weaker, for example, invariance in a low-energy limit. I then discuss how this bears on debates about the metaphysics of laws.
Tyler Hildebrand: “Best Systems: Metaphysical or Epistemological?"
In this paper I provide two distinctions concerning best systems and their application to laws of nature. First, best systems can be interpreted metaphysically or epistemologically. A metaphysical interpretation tells us what it is to be a law of nature. An epistemological interpretation tells us how to determine which laws there are. Second, systematizations can be either complete or incomplete. A complete systematization applies to all facts. An incomplete systematization applies to a proper subset of facts, such as those relevant to a given special science or those that are epistemically accessible. Neither of these distinctions is particularly novel, but their conjunction proves to be quite useful. First, I’ll argue that they undermine claims to the effect that we have better epistemological access to Humean laws than non-Humean laws. Second, I’ll argue that they help to clarify the epistemology of non-Humean theoretical entities. Third, I’ll argue that they help to explain why (as it seems to me) there is currently something of a stalemate between Humeans and non-Humeans about laws.
In this paper I provide two distinctions concerning best systems and their application to laws of nature. First, best systems can be interpreted metaphysically or epistemologically. A metaphysical interpretation tells us what it is to be a law of nature. An epistemological interpretation tells us how to determine which laws there are. Second, systematizations can be either complete or incomplete. A complete systematization applies to all facts. An incomplete systematization applies to a proper subset of facts, such as those relevant to a given special science or those that are epistemically accessible. Neither of these distinctions is particularly novel, but their conjunction proves to be quite useful. First, I’ll argue that they undermine claims to the effect that we have better epistemological access to Humean laws than non-Humean laws. Second, I’ll argue that they help to clarify the epistemology of non-Humean theoretical entities. Third, I’ll argue that they help to explain why (as it seems to me) there is currently something of a stalemate between Humeans and non-Humeans about laws.
Vera Hoffmann-Kolss: “Causal Indeterminacy, Vagueness and Humean Supervenience"
It is commonly assumed that causation is a determinate relation. If c and e and all the relevant background conditions are sufficiently specified, then the claim that c caused e will either be determinately true or determinately false. In the first part of this paper, I present three kinds of cases in which the question whether c caused e does not have a determinate answer: (1) cases of absence causation recently discussed by Bernstein and by Swanson, (2) cases that lead to Sorites paradoxes for causation, and, hence, suggest that causation is a vague relation, and (3) cases in which causal claims are indeterminate if they occur in indeterministic contexts. In the second part of the paper, I explore the consequences of this result for the theory of Humean Supervenience, i.e., the claim that all the causal facts supervene on the non-causal facts.
It is commonly assumed that causation is a determinate relation. If c and e and all the relevant background conditions are sufficiently specified, then the claim that c caused e will either be determinately true or determinately false. In the first part of this paper, I present three kinds of cases in which the question whether c caused e does not have a determinate answer: (1) cases of absence causation recently discussed by Bernstein and by Swanson, (2) cases that lead to Sorites paradoxes for causation, and, hence, suggest that causation is a vague relation, and (3) cases in which causal claims are indeterminate if they occur in indeterministic contexts. In the second part of the paper, I explore the consequences of this result for the theory of Humean Supervenience, i.e., the claim that all the causal facts supervene on the non-causal facts.
Vincent Lam: “Metaphysics of laws in dynamical spacetime and beyond”
This talk aims to update and enrich the two main families of metaphysical conceptions---reductive and non-reductive ones---about laws of nature with insights from fundamental spacetime and gravitational physics. One of the crucial implications of the dynamical nature of general relativistic spacetime is that the global spacetime topology can be non-trivial in a way that may be at odds with the temporal (and ‘production’) aspects of non-reductive accounts. We will discuss the status of the global topological constraints that may be imposed on the spacetime structure within the reductive and non-reductive conceptions about laws. Furthermore, we will specifically highlight certain relevant features of the initial value formulation of general relativity for the relationship between laws and counterfactuals. We will conclude with considerations on how to generalize the standard conceptions about laws of nature to the quantum gravity context where spacetime may not be fundamental.
This talk aims to update and enrich the two main families of metaphysical conceptions---reductive and non-reductive ones---about laws of nature with insights from fundamental spacetime and gravitational physics. One of the crucial implications of the dynamical nature of general relativistic spacetime is that the global spacetime topology can be non-trivial in a way that may be at odds with the temporal (and ‘production’) aspects of non-reductive accounts. We will discuss the status of the global topological constraints that may be imposed on the spacetime structure within the reductive and non-reductive conceptions about laws. Furthermore, we will specifically highlight certain relevant features of the initial value formulation of general relativity for the relationship between laws and counterfactuals. We will conclude with considerations on how to generalize the standard conceptions about laws of nature to the quantum gravity context where spacetime may not be fundamental.
Christian Löw and Siegfried Jaag: “Humean reductionism and iterated counterfactuals”
Humean reductionism about laws of nature is the view that the laws reduce to the total distribution of non-modal or categorical properties in spacetime. However, there is a worry that Humean reductionism cannot account for the characteristic modal resilience of laws under counterfactual suppositions and thus generates wrong verdicts about certain iterated counterfactuals. In this paper, we defend Humean reductionism by providing an account of the counterfactual resilience of Humean laws that gets nested counterfactuals right.
Humean reductionism about laws of nature is the view that the laws reduce to the total distribution of non-modal or categorical properties in spacetime. However, there is a worry that Humean reductionism cannot account for the characteristic modal resilience of laws under counterfactual suppositions and thus generates wrong verdicts about certain iterated counterfactuals. In this paper, we defend Humean reductionism by providing an account of the counterfactual resilience of Humean laws that gets nested counterfactuals right.
Markus Schrenk: “Production and Necessity”
Hume held the view that “efficacy, agency, power, force, energy, necessity, connexion, and productive quality, are […] nearly synonymous.” (Hume, Treatise, p. 157) The notion of production has been equated with or has been analysed in terms of necessity ever since. Focusing on (diachronic, dynamic) laws of nature, this talk is an attempt to explicate a notion of production which is free of modal connotations. However, second, it also aims to develop ways in which a (non-modally conceived) production can account for the (nomological) necessity with which laws govern their instances. The leitmotif for the latter idea parallels the Finean move to ground metaphysical necessity in essence rather than vice versa: production is to nomological necessity what essence is said to be for metaphysical necessity.
Hume held the view that “efficacy, agency, power, force, energy, necessity, connexion, and productive quality, are […] nearly synonymous.” (Hume, Treatise, p. 157) The notion of production has been equated with or has been analysed in terms of necessity ever since. Focusing on (diachronic, dynamic) laws of nature, this talk is an attempt to explicate a notion of production which is free of modal connotations. However, second, it also aims to develop ways in which a (non-modally conceived) production can account for the (nomological) necessity with which laws govern their instances. The leitmotif for the latter idea parallels the Finean move to ground metaphysical necessity in essence rather than vice versa: production is to nomological necessity what essence is said to be for metaphysical necessity.
Tuomas Tahko: “Special Science Laws and Higher-Level Kinds”
What is the ontological status of special science laws and higher-level kinds? Are the special sciences autonomous in virtue of featuring genuine laws and natural kinds? Jerry Fodor once wrote that if we disagree about what is a natural kind, then, for the same reason, we will probably also disagree about what is a (genuine) law. For the ontological anti-reductionist, it’s important to demonstrate that at least some special science laws and higher-level kinds are “really there”. A traditional argument suggests that the multiple realizability of higher-level kinds does just this. But this argument needs to be supported by a theory of realization that does not already assume the existence of genuine special science laws or higher-level kinds. We will analyse some traditional examples, such as the case of jade, and suggest that some problematic assumptions may have influenced much of the literature on multiple realization.
What is the ontological status of special science laws and higher-level kinds? Are the special sciences autonomous in virtue of featuring genuine laws and natural kinds? Jerry Fodor once wrote that if we disagree about what is a natural kind, then, for the same reason, we will probably also disagree about what is a (genuine) law. For the ontological anti-reductionist, it’s important to demonstrate that at least some special science laws and higher-level kinds are “really there”. A traditional argument suggests that the multiple realizability of higher-level kinds does just this. But this argument needs to be supported by a theory of realization that does not already assume the existence of genuine special science laws or higher-level kinds. We will analyse some traditional examples, such as the case of jade, and suggest that some problematic assumptions may have influenced much of the literature on multiple realization.
Tobias Wilsch: “Governance and Production”
Some explanations are productive, others are not. The sources that underlie productive explanations govern the facts. It is part of the manifest image that causal explanations are productive, and hence that the laws of nature govern. In this paper, I investigate what features the laws need to have to govern the facts. I will develop a general account of governance, which allows us to distinguish governing from non-governing sources of explanation. I argue that governance should not be understood in terms of ontological ground, and it should also not be understood in a merely negative way as ‘explanation that does not fit the Humean mold’. My positive proposal is the axiomatic account of governance, which says that some phenomenon governs the facts, because it is characterized by certain modal axioms.
Some explanations are productive, others are not. The sources that underlie productive explanations govern the facts. It is part of the manifest image that causal explanations are productive, and hence that the laws of nature govern. In this paper, I investigate what features the laws need to have to govern the facts. I will develop a general account of governance, which allows us to distinguish governing from non-governing sources of explanation. I argue that governance should not be understood in terms of ontological ground, and it should also not be understood in a merely negative way as ‘explanation that does not fit the Humean mold’. My positive proposal is the axiomatic account of governance, which says that some phenomenon governs the facts, because it is characterized by certain modal axioms.