Properties and Property Individuation
PI: Dr. Vera Hoffmann-Kolss (Cologne)
The aim of project B2 “Properties and Property Individuation” is to develop a metaphysical theory of properties capable of explaining how properties are understood and individuated in scientific contexts. Is there a minority class of fundamental or genuine properties upon which all other properties supervene? Under what conditions are we entitled to conclude that some property P is identical with some property Q? Our understanding of properties has a crucial impact on our understanding of other metaphysically important notions, in particular notions that concern natural modalities, such as laws of nature, causation and the question how to conceive of necessary connections. B2 starts from the assumption that the questions what genuine properties there are and how properties are to be individuated can and should be tackled from a science-oriented perspective. According to many scientific theories, some properties are considered more fundamental than others. Moreover, it is widely agreed that at least some property identities, such as water = H2O or heat = molecular motion, can only be established on an empirical basis, and this plausibly implies a causal criterion of property individuation.
B2 seeks to defend this approach against challenges arising from the recent metaphysical debate on properties. In particular, it will be investigated whether only properties belonging to certain categories (such as lower-level or determinate properties) qualify as genuine, which concept of causation is best suited to back a causal criterion of property individuation and whether such a criterion can account for hyperintensional differences among properties.
The aim of project B2 “Properties and Property Individuation” is to develop a metaphysical theory of properties capable of explaining how properties are understood and individuated in scientific contexts. Is there a minority class of fundamental or genuine properties upon which all other properties supervene? Under what conditions are we entitled to conclude that some property P is identical with some property Q? Our understanding of properties has a crucial impact on our understanding of other metaphysically important notions, in particular notions that concern natural modalities, such as laws of nature, causation and the question how to conceive of necessary connections. B2 starts from the assumption that the questions what genuine properties there are and how properties are to be individuated can and should be tackled from a science-oriented perspective. According to many scientific theories, some properties are considered more fundamental than others. Moreover, it is widely agreed that at least some property identities, such as water = H2O or heat = molecular motion, can only be established on an empirical basis, and this plausibly implies a causal criterion of property individuation.
B2 seeks to defend this approach against challenges arising from the recent metaphysical debate on properties. In particular, it will be investigated whether only properties belonging to certain categories (such as lower-level or determinate properties) qualify as genuine, which concept of causation is best suited to back a causal criterion of property individuation and whether such a criterion can account for hyperintensional differences among properties.
